We never expected that – a corporative study of failures in national and business intelligence by Avner Barnea

Authors

  • Klaus Solberg Söilen Halmstad University

Keywords:

israeli intelligence, The Johari Window Model

Abstract

For JISIB Barnea has previously written about
competitive intelligence in Israel (2016), about
Israeli start-ups in cyber security (2018), and
about how AI will change intelligence and
decision-making (2020).
The book, We never expected that – A
corporative study of failures in national and
business intelligence, is not on Israeli
intelligence per se. Still, the best documented
of the four cases presented come from the First
Intifada in 1993 when Barnea was well
situated to observe what was going on behind
the scenes. For 27 years, until 1997, he was the
Senior Official for Intelligence in the Prime
Minister’s office. Since then, he has been a
competitive intelligence consultant, a teacher
and student of intelligence studies and sine
2016 a research fellow at the National Security
Studies Center, NSSC.
The book, which is a translation of a book in
Hebrew, which again builds on the author’s
PhD thesis, proposes an analysis of a series of
intelligence failures. To study failures is a good
way to learn. It is a good methodology, maybe
the best. To present a book with both
government and state failures is also a good
idea from the perspective that there are bound
to be fruitful parallels. So far so good.

References

Barnea, A. (2015). Failures in National and

Business Intelligence: a Comparative

Study. PhD Diss., University of Haifa, 66-129.

Barnea, A. (2016). Study on competitive

intelligence in Israel: 2016 update. Journal of

Intelligence Studies in Business, 6(2).

Barnea, A. (2018). Israeli start-ups–especially in

cyber security: Can a new model enhance their

survival rate? Journal of Intelligence Studies

in Business, 8(1).

Barnea, A. (2020). How will AI change

intelligence and decision-making? Journal of

Intelligence Studies in Business, 1(1).

Barnea, A. (2021). We Never Expected That: A

Comparative Study of Failures in National

and Business Intelligence. Rowman &

Littlefield.

Behnke, L., & Slayton, P. (1998). Shaping a

corporate competitive intelligence function at

IBM. Competitive Intelligence Review:

Published in Cooperation with the Society of

Competitive Intelligence Professionals, 9(2), 4-

Cockburn, A., & Cockburn, L. (1991). Dangerous

liaison: the inside story of the US-Israeli covert

relationship. HarperCollins.

Denning, Steve (2011). “Why did IBM Survive”,

Forbes, Jul 10th Handel, M. I. (1984).

Intelligence and the problem of strategic

surprise. The Journal of Strategic

Studies, 7(3), 229-281

Kahana, E. (2006). Historical dictionary of Israeli

intelligence. Scarecrow Press.

Knight, F. H. (1921). Risk, uncertainty and

profit (Vol. 31). Houghton Mifflin.

Prescott, J. E., & Williams, R. (2003). The userdriven competitive intelligence model: a new

paradigm for CI. Competitive intelligence

magazine, 6(5), 10-14.

Singer, J. D. (1958). Threat-perception and the

armament-tension dilemma. Journal of

Conflict Resolution, 2(1), 90-105.

Downloads

Published

2022-02-16